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As I suppose any prudent academic could he expected 
to do, I have carefully scrutinized the productions of others 
who have been subjected to the ordeal of an inaugural such 
as this. Among those who have been anthropologists I note 
that almost without fail they remark on the fact that such 
an occasion is a rite of passage, a term first elaborated by 
van Gennep to describe the ritual marking the transition of 
an individual from one status to another. Tn our academic 
culture, the transition to which the inaugural is attached is 
sometimes, in a rather quaint way, referred to as “elevation 
to a chair.” T sincerely hope that this elevation will not 
provide yet another corroborative piece of evidence for the 
thesis recently advanced by Dr. Lawrence Peter, and called 
after him “The Peter Principle” . This proposition, which 
threatens to establish itself in a position as invulnerable as 
that enjoyed by Parkinson’s Law, states that in a hierarchy 
every employee tends to rise to the level of his own in­
competence. This University is certainly ordered hierarchi­
cally, and two corollaries of this Principle will immediately 
present themselves to those of my colleagues with any 
experience in deductive logic, both with equally disquieting 
implications. One states that, given time, in such a hierarchy 
every post tends to be occupied by an employee who is 
incompetent to carry out its duties, and, finally, that in 
such an organization work is only accomplished by those 
employees who have not, as yet. reached their level of 
incompetence.
But turning now, Mr. Vice-Chancellor, from what I
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hope are only matters of levity, I have noted that inaugural 
lectures tend to be of two types. One type tends to focus 
narrowly upon an area of the incumbent’s special competence, 
attempting analysis which represents some theoretical ad­
vance. The other type is an outline approach, which strives 
to give a review of the salient theoretical considerations in­
forming the discipline concerned, suggesting guidelines for 
effective teaching, research and other programme. For 
tonight’s occasion I have chosen the second course of action. 
Tonight we mark the inauguration, not only of an incumbent, 
but of a chair itself. Tonight we mark the first formal 
commitment of a university in Africa to a programme of 
ethnic and race relations studies on this scale. Time does not 
permit me to describe the events that have led to the estab­
lishment of this chair, but T must remark at this point that 
I am honoured tonight by the presence of a number of people 
who have significantly contributed to its establishment. I 
refer in particular to Professor A. S. Mathews. Dean of the 
School of Law in the University of Natal and Dr. Eric Gargett 
of the Bulawayo Municipality, both Trustees of the Maurice 
Webb Estate. T refer also to Mr. Bob Stumbles and Mr. 
Richard van Niekerk, past and present presidents of Round 
Table Central Africa, and Mr. Ken Wilson, the driving force 
behind Round Table’s interest in race relations research for 
many years. T only regret that Mrs. Webb, widow of the late 
Maurice Webb, and Dr. Edgar Brookes, his close friend and 
associate, are not able to share in this occasion for reasons 
of health.
Because therefore of the special inaugural characteristics 
of this occasion. I have chose a broad embracing perspective 
concerning race relations rather than one which focuses on 
some particular aspect of the field. But beyond this, we must 
also recognize that the designation of ethnic and racial 
studies as a discrete and separate field of academic endeavour 
is comparatively recent. The field has yet to establish a 
disciplinary independence of its own. and is best seen at 
present, I believe, as an interdisciplinary focus on a related 
series of problems of great practical and theoretic importance. 
At this stage in the development of racial and ethnic studies
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we are, therefore, still very much tied to the task of identifying 
and formulating the right questions. This task is, of course, 
one of the most exacting and creative parts of scientific 
enquiry. Darwin, in recalling the course of his inquiries into 
the origin of the species wrote, “ . . .you would be surprised 
at the number of years it took me to see clearly what were 
some of the problems which had to be solved . . . Looking 
back T think it was more difficult to see what the problems were 
than to solve them as far as I have succeeded in doing, and 
this seems to me rather curious.”1 What Darwin considered 
curious is accepted by most scientists today as being a given 
element in their task. As Banton put it, “The obstacle to 
greater understanding is often not that of finding new answers 
but of discovering new questions, which, by reformulating the 
old ones, make possible their solution.”2 This is perhaps a 
clue concerning the potential of race relations studies to 
contribute to theoretical advance within its constituent dis­
ciplines — in reformulating, by virtue of its interdisciplinary 
approach, questions which have been asked before in such 
a way as to produce new insights.
This lecture does not attempt such a reformulation as 
such, ft does not attempt to produce a list of the right 
questions, nor does it attempt a comprehensive “propositional 
inventory” for race relations research. What it does attempt 
is a designation of the contexts in which these questions — 
and their answers — can most fruitfully be sought, particu­
larly in Southern Africa — a kind of epistemological and 
methodological overview of our subject. I proceed, therefore, 
by setting before you five basic postulates which I believe 
should inform our approach to racial and ethnic studies in 
this University. They are, if you will, premises for which I 
believe there is reasonable justification and which should 
form the basis for our programme.
1. Postulate No. 1.
My first postulate is that, in the evaluation of the ability, 
value and potential of any specific human being, membership 
in any racial population, defined genetically, is per se irrele-
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vant. This is not to suggest that research into such questions 
as, for instance, whether the intelligence quotient of say the 
Irish is statistically lower than that of the Japanese, is not 
under certain circumstances worthwhile. “Race" in such an 
exercise is an independent variable which may, or may not, 
be found to be significant. But when applied to individuals, 
it is a dependent variable mediated by so many intervening 
variables, such as culture, individual heredity and social 
status, that it cannot be regarded as significant. The implica­
tion of this is that, in terms of the most effective utilization of 
human resources, the stereotypic tendency of so many 
cultures to arbitrarily assign roles to individuals on the basis 
of racial or ethnic membership is dysfunctional, wasteful and 
prima facie undesirable.
From this point of view, it has been said that there is 
no such thing as “good race relations”. Race as a socially 
significant category is based on false assumptions, and is best 
dispensed with. The task of the race relations analyst, 
according to this position, thus becomes an exercise in the 
study of some form of social or economic pathology, and 
racial factors are reduced to some other kind of socially 
differentiated structure, such as class.
Nevertheless, the social category of race does exist, and 
as John Rex has recently pointed out it is an open question 
as to whether class really does have some kind of superior 
ontological status to raced One of the questions which we 
have to pose, therefore, is what the characteristics are of 
those situations in which men define as racial.
This is another way of saying that the matter of race 
relations is primarily a problem for social science rather than 
biology, although as I have already suggested, I do not 
discount the inputs of biology. The biologists have been 
asked to pronounce on the matter of race, and have done so. 
Among their most important findings are:
(1) That “race” as a taxonomic concept is of limited 
usefulness as a means of classifying human beings, 
less useful than the more general concept of popula­
tions.
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(2) These populations are Mendelian populations situated 
as a continuum, and human biological variation is to 
be thought of in statistical terms as a series of differ­
ences of degree in different measures.
(3) These biological populations by no means coincide 
with “races” in the popular use of the term.
(4) It is. in the light of this lack of coincidence, and on the 
basis of present data, not justifiable to attribute cul­
tural chaiactcristics to the effect of genetic inheritance.*
As Dobzhansky points out, this relativity, this lack of 
hard-and-fast dichotomies in race relations, is disappointing 
to the adherents of old-fashioned typological race concepts.5 
But it does not thereby banish them. The concept of race is 
declared trivial in science, but continues to be seen by laymen 
as decisive in everyday life. And this is the reality which is 
our central concern, for it structures institutions, determines 
relationships and shapes attitudes. Thomas’ incisive observa­
tion. “If men define situations as real, they are real in their 
consequences" remains as a central axiom for race relations 
research. I began discussion on this postulate with the 
assertion that in the evaluation of any individual human 
being’s intrinsic potential, membership in an ethnic or racial 
category was irrelevant. But actual potential is determined 
by the addition of cultural and social factors. What we know 
biologically is therefore qualified sociologically by Thomas’ 
caveat.
Thus it is the category of “social race” with which we 
are concerned. But the phrase is misleading if we think of 
social characteristics as being independent of physical ones. 
Race becomes socially significant when biologically inherited 
characteristics, either real or imputed, are correlated with 
social characteristics which confer distinctive roles and rights. 
A further cognate category is provided by ethnicity, where 
distinctions in ascriptive role allocations are made on the 
basis of culture, again either real or imputed. This category, 
since it shares with race a situation in which roles and pre­
rogatives are assigned on the basis of characteristics thought 
to be unchanging, must come within the scope of race rela­
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tions studies and is to be inferred in this lecture when the 
phrase “race relations” is used.
Race relations studies deal, therefore, with situations 
of differentation arising not from any biologically determined 
base per se, but from social distinctions related to physical 
and cultural criteria of an ascriptive kind and rationalized in 
terms of deterministic ideology.
2. Postulate No. 2.
My second postulate is a negative one, and put in this 
form since it is at variance with what has been a basic 
assumption in race relations research elsewhere. This is that, 
internationally, prevailing trends in societal organizations are 
not necessarily in a non-racial, integralionisl direction. It 
has been an assumption in race relations research in the 
United States, in Britain and elsewhere that, regardless of 
peripheral counter-currents, the main stream of human events 
has been moving towards the disestablishment of race as a 
central determinant in human society. Schermerhorn calls 
this the centripetal view of social history, seeing a long-term 
tendency towards increased acceptance of common values 
and increased participation in a common set of groups, 
associations and institutions/’
Unfortunately, this is an assumption not borne out by 
the events of the last decade. The tide of ethnic, regional and 
racial separation runs high. Tn the United States, where it 
was long assumed that the blacks would accept as much 
integration as was ofTered them an increasing number of their 
leaders are swinging towards a black nationalism that calls for 
an autonomy reminiscent of apartheid. A similar trend in 
the re-direction of cultural and political goals on the part of 
Africans is now to be seen in South Africa, and is likely 
here. As one American newspaper put it recently, “This 
crowded world is cracking asunder. Togetherness is out. 
It is now a dirty twelve-letter word. The ‘in’ thing is to split, 
separate, get sore and quit.”7 These are centrifugal tendencies, 
encouraging the retention of distinctive traditions and the 
maintenance of structural segregation.
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When the scene is examined internationally and cross- 
culturally, the reality is of course that both centripetal and 
centrifugal factors can be identified. The implication of this 
for race relations research is, 1 believe, that we cannot 
assume as many in the field have done to date — that we 
are in effect examining the detail of a unidirectional and 
inevitable trend towards non-racialism. Direction may be the 
other way. and we have therefore to consider centrifugal as 
well as centripetal possibilities. 1 am not of course suggesting 
that a non-racial ordering of society is an inappropriate goal. 
What I am pointing out is the epistemological danger of 
mistaking the wish for fact, or of assuming some kind of 
teleological determinism concerning this aspect of human 
development.
3 Postulate No. 3.
My third postulate suggests that race relations studies 
must proceed simultaneously along two lines, that they must 
incorporate both theoretic and utilitarian objectives. The 
demand that academic enterprises be relevant and utilitarian 
is not confined to the area of race, but in no area is it more 
pressing and in my opinion correctly so.
Tn both the United States and Great Britain financial 
support for race relations research has been motivated by a 
melioristic interest in the improvement of relations between 
different racial groups and Blumer comments regarding the 
U.S., “It is safe to say that if the various racial groups in 
American society had had harmonious and democratic 
relationships, no field of race relations study would ever have 
emerged.”8 My own Chair is a case in point, and was 
established to study “the relations between the various ethnic 
and language groups which make up . . . the population, with 
a view to discovering causes of tensions that may exist 
between them and to suggesting ways by which the causes of 
such tensions may be removed.”9
Others have phrased the question more bluntly. Tn a 
recent article discussing the establishment of a Race Relations
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Research Unit at the University of Bristol, A. H. Halsey of 
Nufheld College, Oxford, sees the basic question about the 
Black British as being, “Will they revolt?” Will there be, 
can there be, peace or feud in Britain at the racial level? To 
gain the answer to this question the Social Research Council 
is putting up £40,000 per annum to Bristol, and a convincing 
answer, says Halsey, “would be fabulously cheap at such a 
price to both social theorists of order and conflict and those 
directly engaged in race relations practice. ’1"
The important question for Rhodesia is not dissimilar. 
Perhaps the greatest difference is that, for Rhodesia, the 
question is of even more critical centrality for the future of 
the country than it is for Britain. And yet no public agency 
has come forward with anything like £40.000 per year for 
research into it. To date w'e have had to depend on the 
generosity of people like Maurice Webb and the men of 
Round Table.
Why this apparent lack of concern for research into such 
a critical issue? It may be, of course, that there is plenty of 
will to support this kind of enterprise, and that the public has 
only been waiting for the University to take an initiative in 
this matter. But beyond this, there are other cogent reasons, 
1 believe. Some in this country, either out of mental myopia 
or for convenience, see the arrangements of Rhodesian society 
as essentially static and unchanging, its future a repeated 
replication of the present. For these the suggestion that race 
relations need to be examined is vaguely disturbing, implying 
some defect in the status quo. T have quoted Blumer’s state­
ment that if America had enjoyed harmonious and demo­
cratic relationships the field of race relations study would 
never have merged there. According to this mentality the 
obverse seem to be implied: “If you have no race relations 
studies, harmonious and democratic relationships therefore 
exist.” This attitude approximates what Myrdal called “moral 
cynicism,” the permanent and growing acceptance of incon­
sistencies in the system of values, and reminds one of what 
Time said recently concerning the United States: “ . . . the 
true racism of America is based not on hate, but on in­
difference.”
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There are others — and I consider these more important 
— who recognize the dynamic nature of our society, who are 
concerned about the central problems of race, and yet are 
sceptical that academic research can reveal anything really 
significant about these problems. For them the answers are 
to be found in direct “common-sense” action— legislation, 
political activism and the like. For them, the academic- 
approach represents an over-abstraction of the subject which 
is equivalent to the avoidance of real human issues. In their 
view scientific detachment only leads to a postponement of 
action to resolve urgent crises, the significance of race is 
self-evident and can be handled without needless theorizing.
My response to this is that in many cases, where the in­
congruities between practice and the moral standards of a 
society are self-evident, they are right. In such cases scientific- 
insights are ancilliary to. not necessary for. moral decision and 
action. For example, Morroe Burger, in a brilliant article 
on the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court decision on de-segregation, 
has pointed out that although certain psychological and 
sociological findings were cited, they were not really necessary. 
All that was really required for the decision was the combina­
tion of moral precept and legal precedent that the decision 
in certain sections exemplified.11
Does this then mean that social science is totally irrele­
vant to the making of moral-political decisions? Of course 
not. Speaking of Burger's analysis. Nisbet comments that 
it implies “that we have no more right to expect social 
science to be the immediate platform of social policy or social 
action than we have to expect physiology to be sole and 
immediate platform for measures public health. But (he 
goes on to say) T would be unhappy under any public health 
officer who has never studied physiology.”12
Nisbet’s concluding rider indicates my point. Just as 
there are underlying physiological principles which provide 
the foundation for therapy and prophylaxis, so there are 
underlying social and psychological principles which must 
provide the foundation for intelligent moral and political 
behaviour. Tt is here that, with regard to race relations, the
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social scientist must focus his attention and where he can 
work most fruitfully. And it is in this indirect and mediated 
application of his knowledge that he must have the indulgence 
and understanding of his sponsors. Concern with direct 
application alone would encourage the scholar to rely ex­
clusively on what is already known, to employ the techniques, 
the methods and the data already at hand in order to produce 
quick solutions. As Kaplan and Manners have observed, it 
would have “a tendency to deflect the scientist from the free 
and imaginative speculation which forms the lifeblood of his 
discipline in its growth as a scientific enterprise.-’ Thev go 
on to comment, “if practice and an overwhelming emphasis 
on the applied inevitably produced theoretical wisdom, then 
the field of social work would be the most theoretically 
sophisticated of the social sciences, and all automobile 
mechanics would be physicists.”13
T conclude therefore that in our race relations studies 
we must identify and direct our attention to critical problems 
that seek practical solutions and to arrange our findings for 
utilitarian objectives. As Myrdal has said. “Science becomes 
no better protected against biases by the entirely negative 
device of refusing to arrange its results for practical and 
political utilization.”11 But at the same time these efforts 
must be shaped by theoretical considerations, and recognition 
given to the ordered progress this implies. To quote Merton. 
“The urgency or immensity of a practical social problem 
does not insure its immediate solution . . . Tt must be 
remembered that necessity is only the mother of invention: 
socially accumulated knowledge is its father. Unless the two 
are brought together, necessity remains infertile. She may 
of course conceive at some future time when she is properly 
mated. But the mate requires time (and sustenance) if he is 
to attain the size and vigour needed to meet the demands 
that will be made upon him.”15 Thus race relations should 
be studied in ways which are at once relevant to both policy 
and theory. Indeed it is unlikely that a significant academic 
contribution to the subject could be made in any other way.
Having stated my premise that race relations research
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must proceed simultaneously along both theoretical and 
utilitarian lines, I now wish to indicate some of the more 
useful analytic constructs within which this development can 
take place, and to indicate some ways in which these con­
structs can be given practical application.
I have already indicated my view of the derived character 
of race relations studies- - derived that is from the more 
general theories of other social science disciplines, and from 
law, history and biology.
The history of race relations studies has been one of 
shifting alTinitics with one after another of these disciplines, 
and it is instructive to review the sequence, particularly when 
it is accepted that developments in any discipline represent a 
response both to its intellectual traditions and the contexts 
of the wider cultural and political currents of the times.
Putting aside for the purposes of this lecture pre- 
Darwinian thought on race, it can be observed that most of 
the academic work on this subject between 1860 and 1930 
was the concern of anthropologists. Concerned, as most of 
these men were, with human helerography the emphasis of 
these scholars was largely on the origins and typology of 
the human race. This, coupled with their interest in the 
varieties of culture, led some of them to correlate hereditary 
endowment with group behavioural patterns. Equipped with 
rather sketchy ethnological information, these scholars em­
barked on a course of supra-organic analogy which sought 
to estimate the relative value of races, delineate social 
categories and justify the dynamics of racism. Time does 
not allow for the development of this theme; it must suffice 
here to mention the names of Dr. James Hunt, founder of the 
Anthropological Society of London (1863). John Powell, 
director of the American Bureau of Ethnology. William 
McGee, first president of the American Anthropological 
Association and the famous Lewis Henry Morgan. The 
racist implications of these men's works have long since 
been abandoned in academic circles, but they are still cited 
occasionally by segregationist protagonists, an example of 
the uses made of scientific myths to give authority to
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Ipolitically convenient belief. As Banton has remarked, “Much 
of today’s social folklore is in fact the science of a century 
ago.”16
The racist tendency in anthropological tradition was 
definitively laid to rest by Franz Boas. Boas shifted the em­
phasis in anthropology away from haphazard data collection 
and deductive speculation to one of rigorous and detailed 
research methods and critical objectivity. With this new 
emphasis came an abandonment of speculative attempts to 
correlate cultural with physical types and a shift to an 
emphasis on culture itself. This did not mean an abandon­
ment of all interest in race on the part of anthropologists: 
contact and conflict between different racial groups with its 
attendant stereotypy continued to be of concern to the dis­
cipline. Indeed, some of the best books on race relations in 
what one might call the “early modern period” were written 
by anthropologists. I have in mind here Ruth Benedict’s 
Race: Science and Politics, published in 1945, Kenneth 
Little’s Negroes in Britain, published in 1948 and Hilda 
Kuper’s Uniform of Colour, published in 1947.
But the real emphasis in race relations study shifted 
in the early 1930’s to sociology, this being largely due to the 
efforts of the Chicago school under Robert E. Park, Louis 
Wirth, Robert Redfield and others. To my knowledge, the 
first course taught in race relations at any university was 
that conducted by Park at the University of Chicago during 
this period, and was entitled “Racial and Cultural Contacts”. 
Attention was directed to the so-called “minority” groups in 
American society, and the emphasis shifted from the descrip­
tion of social structure to the study of social processes. Park 
developed a sequential typology with regard to ethnic contact 
and assimulation, which stimulated new research into the 
stresses experienced by groups undergoing adaptation to new 
situations. Among these were studies on the “marginal 
man” conducted by Everett Stonequist and those of “social 
distance” by Emory S. Bogardus.
Stonequist and Bogardus represented two new directions 
in race relations research. One was sociological; the other
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social-psychological. The former followed the trend of em­
phasizing the behaviour of groups in social situations; the 
latter stressed the attitudes and behaviour of individuals. 
The emphasis on social psychology became increasingly 
important, and its leadership in the field of race relations 
studies during the 1940’s and 50’s is demonstrated by the 
prominence given it in Myrdal’s An American Dilemma and 
by the influence of the monumental work by Thomas Adorno 
and his associates published under the title. The Authoritarian 
Personality.
Thus the central matrix for race relations studies had 
shifted from anthropology to sociology to a combination of 
sociology and social psychology. Here it stayed during the 
1960’s, with considerable work being done in the measurement 
of racial attitudes. The one major work on race relations 
done in this country to date, Roger’s and Franz’s Racial 
Themes in Southern Rhodesia, is an example of this approach. 
Tn sociology considerable work was done on the functionality 
of prejudice, discrimination and racial ideologies for system- 
maintenance. This set of emphases has aptly been termed by 
Blumer the “prejudice-discrimination axis”17 and can be fairly 
said to be the central concern of race relations research during 
the decade 1958-1967.
The general character of this approach can be outlined 
as follows:
1. Firstly, the nature of the relations between racial 
groups results from the feeling and attitudes which 
these groups have toward each other.
2. Secondly, therefore, these feelings and attitudes are 
the chief objects to be studied in endeavouring to 
understand race relations.
3. Thirdly, among these feelings and attitudes, prejudice 
and its supporting ideologies are of the greatest im­
portance since it is responsible for discriminatory 
behaviour and racial discord.
4. Fourthly, since prejudice is not innate it is mutable,
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and therefore the greatest promise for the melioration 
of racial conflict lies in its study and transformation.
Increasingly, this position has come under heavy 
criticism. In the last decade students of race relations have, 
by-and-large, been led to the position that the social setting 
of action instead of the racial attitudes of the participants is 
the prime determinant of behaviour. Their position is well 
illustrated by Kohn and Williams, who after examining 
forty-three situations say “ . . . allegedly prejudiced persons 
act in a thoroughly egalitarian manner when this is the socially 
prescribed manner of behaviour . . . allegedly unprejudiced 
persons diserimmale in situations where they feel it is socially 
appropriate to do so."1" The current trend seems to be for 
scholars to accept this position. As Blttmer puts it. “Per­
sonality components of racial prejudice are coming increas­
ingly to be rewarded as mere individual variations inside a 
collectively defined cremation."w a point cogently put by 
Professor Reader in his inaugural lecture.-" As Schermerhorn 
puts it. “If research has confirmed anything, it is that preju­
dice is the product of situations, historical situations, economic 
situations, political situations; it is not a little demon that 
emerges in people simply because they are depraved21
If it is not prejudice but situations which are important, 
what is it that causes societies to engender them and thus 
threaten their own existence? The contexts of sociological 
theory which lie behind this question will be apparent to 
some of my colleagues, and are perhaps best not discussed 
in a lecture of this nature. T shall only note here that the 
contradictions between system and conflict theories are more 
apparent than real. The writings of Max Gluckman are 
seminal. T believe, on this point, and what comes through 
clearly from his analysis is that conflict between groups of 
unequal power creates integrative bonds that have system 
characteristics. Neither the conflict or the systems perspective 
can therefore exclude the other without unwarranted dog­
matism. Certain types of race relations studies draw on sets 
of assumptions from both theories as heuristic guidelines 
for interpretive purposes. Integration is not inevitably har­
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monious, nor conflict necessarily disruptive. There would 
appear to be times when integration results from conflict, and 
conversely, other times when conflict produces a new order 
of integregation.
Thus both the system and the conflict frameworks will 
continue to be of central theoretical significance for race 
relations studies. Conflict or coercion theory will, however, 
gain more central attention, and rightly so I believe. One 
important concomitant of this is that the inputs of the 
disciplines of economics and political science to race relations 
studies will increase. Analysis will move along the line of 
isolating the structures of interests and the structures of con­
trol in given situations. Such a study must necessarily deal 
with such matters as vested interests, entrenched power, the 
inertia of institutions, the use of social codes, the established 
opportunity structure and the responsiveness of office-holders 
and decision-makers. It must trace out. amid the structure of 
sustaining forces, the interlockings, conflicts, accommodations, 
and centres of dominant influence. In particular, attention 
should be given to the efficacy of institutional decree and of 
organized action in bringing about deliberate changes in 
racial relationships.22
Schermerhorn has produced a useful listing of variables 
which can be analysed in comparative context, five of which 
I consider particularly important:
1. The historic sequences of interaction between sub­
ordinate and dominant ethnic and racial groups, such 
as annexation, migration and colonization.
2. The degree of enclosure (institutional separation or 
segmentation) of the subordinate group or groups 
from the society-wide network of institutions and 
associations.
3. The degree of control exercised by dominant groups 
over access to scarce resources by subordinate groups 
in a given society.
4. Agreement or disagreement between dominant and
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subordinate groups on collective goals for the latter, 
such as assimilation, pluralism or segregation.
5. Differential participation rates or subordinates in in­
stitutional and associational life on the basis of 
changing access to resources (such as education, and 
wealth) and changing susceptibility to needs (such as 
population growth and ecological mutations).2'1
It may be useful to note that these five variables have to 
do with sequential, structural, ideological and ecological 
factors.
Tn all of this can be seen the shift from the earlier 
emphasis on attitude and ideology to one underscoring struc­
tural factors. This docs not mean, however, that earlier 
perspectives are completely abandoned. To do so would 
be to fall into a position of procrustean theoretical dogmatism, 
stretching models beyond their clearly relevant application 
regardless of their suitability to the data under consideration. 
Belief and value systems do acquire an independent causal 
significance, and must continue to be a concern for racial 
and ethnic studies.
The variables that we have been discussing have a general 
and comparative significance, and must form the subject 
matter of the development of the discipline on an inter­
national. cross-national basis. Data that we produce here 
relevant to any of them will be a contribution to inter­
national scholarship. But this Chair is located in Southern 
Africa, our resources are limited and we obviously cannot 
pursue them all in requisite depth. It is therefore important 
that, within the general and comparative theoretical frame­
work I have been discussing, we identify those special con­
ditions which pertain to our situation here, in which we can 
make our best contribution to international scholarship and 
which furnish the best potential for “pay-off” in the applied 
field.
What, then, are these specific conditions in our situation 
which must shape our research? There are four which bear 
special attention:
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1. First of all it should be noted that Rhodesia is one 
of the few polities left in the world where the politically 
superordinate group constitutes a small — perhaps I should 
say very small — racial minority.
2. Secondly, Rhodesia is virtually unique in being per­
haps the only country in the world in which the trend of 
current legislation is overtly, ostensibly moving towards a 
more segregationist position. Regardless of whether one 
considers this to be a reasoned response to the exigencies of 
the historical moment or an incredibly naive reactionism, this 
fact alone makes Rhodesia an important case study for race 
relations research. This leads me to make a methodological 
aside that the dynamic, fluid nature of our situation makes 
it imperative that our research be carried out with built-in 
time depth. Diachronic studies incorporating reciprocal 
design should be our objective whenever possible.
3. Thirdly, the Rhodesian population represents a high 
degree of racial and ethnic heterogeneity. We have, not two, 
but a number of sub-groups in the population defined racially. 
Added to this are a number of ethnically defined sub-groups 
including the so-called tribal categories. All of these sub­
groups must be considered in any comprehensive programme 
of racial and ethnic studies, and their close juxtaposition in a 
country of this size must be considered a special circumstance.
4. Fourthly, Rhodesia, a small country, is uniquely 
located in a geographically contiguous position to four other 
countries, all of them marked by racial pluralism and at least 
three of which have markedly different official policies on 
race. If we add to the list Malawi and Malagasy, the number 
of variants is even further augmented. This richness in varia­
tion, essential for comparative study, means that this Univer­
sity is ideally located for study of this kind. Furthermore, the 
size of these countries means that the data they evoke can be 
studied with a thoroughness not possible where national units 
are far larger. We are, for instance, currently involved in an 
aspirations study of the entire African school-leaver popula­
tion at the Form Four level. None of the other race relations 
study centres in the world, even with their vastly greater
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resources, could even begin to contemplate such a compre­
hensive exercise in their own countries.
These then are the special circumstances which pertain 
for us here, and of which we must take the fullest advantage. 
They are among the reasons which make me assert that, 
properly planned and supported, a programme of racial and 
ethnic studies could be developed here which would be of 
international significance and put this University in the fore­
front of academic enterprises of this type.
Time does not permit me to detail the specific research 
prospects which T see as furthering this kind of programme. 
But with regard to their design, let me summarize what I 
have been suggesting. They must be constructed and carried 
out with regard to the theoretical implications of the sequen­
tial. structural, ideological and ecologic variables that I have 
mentioned. They must be constructed with the specific con­
ditions pertaining to race in Southern Africa as a special 
consideration. And finally, they must be constructed so that 
their findings are useable by those wishing to intelligently 
shape the future of Rhodesian society. This final objective, 
as I have already suggested, can best be achieved by making 
explicit the dynamics of present structures, the trends that 
they evince, the probable future consequences of the various 
alternative policies that may be available to the body politic, 
and by giving an indication of those that are clearly more 
feasible, practicable or possible than others.
4 Postulate No. 4.
This brings me to my fourth postulate, which is that race 
relations study in the university context should attempt an 
approximation of the standards of objectivity and detachment 
which have been the tradition of the social sciences. The 
attainability or advisability of such a stance has been in­
creasingly called into question recently. On the one hand it is 
argued that such detachment is impossible in the social 
sciences, that the social scientist is inevitably part of the 
data he is studying and that he cannot free himself from 
dependence on the dominant preconceptions and biases of his
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intellectual environment. Myrdal’s outburst is illustrative: 
“A disinterested social science is pure nonsense. It never 
existed and it will never exist.”-1 On the other hand it is 
suggested that such detachment, were it possible, could only 
result in the social scientist becoming the unwitting tool of 
the dominant social and political forces of the times.
My rejection of this argument is in part negative — is 
the alternative of valuation and commitment any better basis 
for a valid social science? Speaking of anthropology, Kaplan 
and Manners comment that if such a lead were followed, 
“what passes for anthropological knowledge would be nothing 
more than a pack of ideologies from which one might pick 
and choose according to one's aesthetic tastes, political 
beliefs or other value biases. To anyone interested in a 
science of culture (or indeed in the creation and dissemination 
of any reliable knowledge) this kind of epistemological rela­
tivism is unthinkable.”25
My own opinion is that relative objectivity can be 
achieved if, on the one hand the scientist recognizes his own 
valuations and admits them as such, and if on the other he 
constantly maintains guard over the independence of his 
position. Notice the adjective “relative". No scientist can 
claim complete objectivity, let alone one dealing with society.
Such relative detachment and objectivity as is possible in 
no way implies irrelevance, a truth recognized by some who 
have for long been involved in social activism. Earlier this 
year 1 spent a delightful day on the campus of Stanford 
University as the guest of Professor St. Clair Drake, Professor 
of Black Studies. Drake, a student of Robert E. Park, a 
close associate of W. Lloyd Warner and a product of the 
Chicago School mentioned earlier, was for many years cen­
trally involved in Negro activism in the United States and 
elsewhere. The mantle of W. E. du Bois fell on his shoulders 
and he became something of an academic eminance gris 
behind some of the West African nationalist leaders of the 
late 50’s and early 60’s. I elaborate on this, Mr. Chairman, 
to demonstrate that his opinion can hardly be considered 
that of an equivocating, insulated Uncle Tom-like academic.
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During the course of our conversations I put to him the 
question as to which social scientists in America he con­
sidered to be doing the most significant work on race relations 
in terms of long-range impact. Without hestitation he named 
two Harvard sociologists, Thomas Pettigrew and Lee Rain­
water. Listen now to a statement by Rainwater on this 
matter, an opinion which in the light of the endorsement by 
Drake must be given special weight. Speaking of the poplar 
appeal being made to sociology in the United States for various 
action programmes, Rainwater says, “The autonomy of the 
sociologist to pursue knowledge and develop theory will be 
seriously threatened by this popularity — not only by the 
threat of co-optation by the powers that be, but also by the 
threat of ideological co-optation in the service of the powers 
against the powers that be . . . Sociology is in a position 
today to make critical contributions to changing society, 
but it is in that position only by virtue of several decades 
of empirical and theoretical work which was relatively 
insulated from direct political interference by the society at 
large or on the campus.”26
The value of this independence was recognized by 
Maurice Webb when he left his money for race relations 
research in an academic context. Tt is a value I subscribe to 
and will seek to maintain. As Anatol Rapaport has com­
mented, “Science, with its attitude of detachment, is the only 
mode of cognition we know which can make showdowns 
between incompatible views productive and which can reveal 
the degree of incompatibility between views. Hence logical 
analysis, extension of concepts, tests of hypotheses, and all the 
rest cannot be avoided if we wish the clashes between serious 
thinkers to generate light as well as heat.”27 In our ideo­
logically and culturally polarized society, the academic forum 
is one of the few places left which may be able to generate 
serious thinking on race between incompatible positions. 
Handled wisely, it may be a source of light as well.
5. Postulate No. 5.
I come now to my fifth and final postulate. This is that
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reason is the continuing central context of the academic 
enterprise, and that intellectual clarity and enlightened 
citizenship its continuing long-range objectives.
Up to this point my treatment of racial and ethnic studies 
has treated almost exclusively with research. I regard my 
Chair as primarily a research post, but it has a teaching 
function as well, and it is of this that I now wish to speak 
briefly. In a sense, this may be its most important function.
With regard to its potential to effect desirable change, 
the university tradition has always been essentially futuristic. 
By-and-large, we do not seek short-term, dramatic results. 
We may hope that our research will influence policy, but our 
most significant, enduring contribution to change is vested in 
the training that we give our students — in the development 
of their intellectual potential, in the sharpening of their 
critical judgment, in the impartation of the enriching possi­
bilities of human reason. This is a faith and a tradition which 
the academic community draws from its roots in the En­
lightenment. Aligning himself with this position, one socio­
logist, Reinhard Bendix, has put it very well: “ . . .  in a 
world torn by wars of nerves, arms and words, the universities 
are institutions of detachment whose academic personnel have 
an important service to render in the community, one for 
which they may properly claim recognition from the powers 
that be. Social scientists, to reiterate, should place their 
abiding faith in reason rather than on exclusive concern with 
improving the techniques of social manipulations. This is the 
only position worthy of the great intellectual traditions of 
which they are heirs. It is also the only position consistent 
with the intellectual defense against totalitarianism, from 
without and within.”28
This is the tradition that we seek to impart to our 
students. This is our most important function. When we 
look carefully at this country of ours, we see accomplishments 
of which we can be proud. But we also see, as Bendix puts 
it, “wars of nerves, arms and words,” and we can only hope 
that the coming generation of leaders in this land, who now 
pass through our halls, will deal with the problems of our
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society with more rationality than we have. In the area of 
race relations study, this rationality should imparl the wisdom 
once stated aphoristically by Kluckhohn when he observed 
that “Every man is in certain respects: (a) like no other man, 
(b) like some other men, and (c) like all other men.”-’!, Beyond 
the very real divisions created by structure and culture, our 
students should perceive the essential unity of mankind. The 
fact that at this University students of different racial and 
ethnic groups can gain this insight together is an earnest of 
this intent. This is why I am anxious that the greater part 
of our studies be conducted by those who are themselves 
vanhu ve’iva, the sons of this land and all its races. This 
is why I derive so much satisfaction from the fact that the 
larger proportion of our support comes from within Southern 
Africa. For the study of race relations in this land cannot, 
must not, be an alien, imposed device. It must rise from our 
own initiative, speak to our own problems, and evoke the 
strengths of our own common humanity.
Maurice Webb, after whom this Chair is named, had this 
kind of insight. Sixteen years ago he wrote, “I believe that 
no true society can exist unless there is at the heart of it love 
of man for man and love of man for God. You cannot love 
a man and hide him behind a green belt or a ghetto wall. 
You must know him as a person and see God in his face.”30 
Sometimes this Image of Man comes only through bitter 
experience. Sometimes it comes through religious insight. 
And sometimes it comes through training in the critical use of 
the intellect. From this perspective, the academic study of 
racial and ethnic relations can be regarded as an exercise in 
the analysis, qualification and mitigation of the stereotypic 
tendency which is such a ubiquitous, and often disastrous, 
characteristic of human culture.
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